Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy by Kelly H. Chang

By Kelly H. Chang

Concentrating on how the President and the Senate impact financial coverage by means of appointing Federal Reserve Board participants, this booklet solutions 3 questions on the appointment technique and its results. First, do politicians effect financial coverage through Federal Reserve appointments? moment, who affects the process--only the President or the President and the Senate? 3rd, how is the constitution of the Federal Reserve appointment technique defined? The examine extends the research of the Federal Reserve Board to the ecu vital financial institution.

Show description

Read or Download Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions) PDF

Similar money & monetary policy books

From Asian to Global Financial Crisis: An Asian Regulator's View of Unfettered Finance in the 1990s and 2000s

This can be a exact insider account of the hot international of unfettered finance. the writer, an Asian regulator, examines how outdated mindsets, marketplace fundamentalism, free financial coverage, hold alternate, lax supervision, greed, cronyism, and monetary engineering brought on either the Asian drawback of the overdue Nineties and the present worldwide obstacle of 2008-2009.

The State Theory of Money

2013 Reprint of 1924 version. complete facsimile of the unique version, no longer reproduced with Optical popularity software program. Georg Friedrich Knapp (1842-1926) used to be a German economist who in 1895 released "The kingdom conception of Money," which based the chartalist college of economic conception, which takes the statist stance that money should have no intrinsic worth and strictly be used as governmentally-issued token, i.

The cross of gold: Money and the Canadian business cycle, 1867-1913

An interesting view of the Canadian financial system ahead of WWI, this learn fills a niche within the present literature at the financial background of Canada. utilizing superior financial data, the writer explains how the company cycle labored lower than the most efficient, and takes an in-depth examine the jobs the banks, the govt. and the general public performed on the subject of Canada's stability of funds and the gold inventory.

50 Years of the German Mark: Essays in Honour of Stephen F. Frowen

This well timed assortment provides an authoritative assessment of 1 of the 3 key currencies of the second one half the 20 th century, the German Mark. In his keynote essays, Charles A. E. Goodhart displays at the way forward for the Euro opposed to the historical past of the luck tale of the Deutsche Mark.

Extra resources for Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Sample text

At time t, each FOMC member receives a 21 22 The coding of the data is binary due to limitations in the voting data. See data section for more details. We can also entertain other distributional assumptions. I assume the normal for convenience. The resulting estimation of the probit model is relatively simple, and the estimates are consistent for large T. 41 Estimating Monetary Policy Preferences take-it-or-leave-it question based on the current interest rate: Do you find a higher interest rate acceptable compared to the current interest rate?

The first set defines the nonunique correspondences between an appointee and outcomes: (1) x ≤ x5 ⇒ (2) x ≥ x8 ⇒ x5 + x7 = L2 ≤ L1 2 x7 + x8 SQ2 = = H2 = H1 2 SQ2 = In (1), since x5 ≤ x6, this lower limit will be lower than in Range 1: L2 < L1. According to (2), the upper limit stays the same: H1 = H2. In sum, Range 1 ≤ Range 2. The second set defines the unique outcomes. 5: Range 4 Thus the complete range of outcomes for y ∈ {x6} is L2 ≤ SQ2 ≤ H2, where L2 ≤ L1 and H1 = H2 such that Range 1 ≤ Range 2.

Essentially he gains leverage from his first-mover advantage. In Case 1, if the Senate moved first rather than the president, the outcomes would be either S or the president’s indifference point, much as the current Case 2 is favorable toward the president. In Case 2, the outcome would be S rather than P or SQ− ; there would be Senate dominance. But in the current constitutional setup, because the president is the agenda setter, he can use this advantage in order to obtain a point closer to or identical to his ideal point in either of the first two cases.

Download PDF sample

Rated 4.80 of 5 – based on 47 votes