By Sergio Tenenbaum
'We wish all and simply these issues we conceive to be strong; we stay away from what we conceive to be bad.' This slogan was the traditional view of the connection among wish or motivation and rational evaluate. Many critics have rejected this scholastic formulation as both trivial or mistaken. it seems that to be trivial if we simply outline the nice as 'what we want', and unsuitable if we think about obvious conflicts among what we appear to wish and what we appear to imagine is nice. In Appearances of the nice, Sergio Tenenbaum argues that the previous slogan is either major and correct, even in situations of obvious clash among our wants and our evaluative decisions. holding that the great is the formal finish of useful inquiry in a lot a similar manner as fact is the formal finish of theoretical inquiry, he presents a completely unified account of motivation and evaluate.
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Extra info for Appearances of the Good: An Essay on the Nature of Practical Reason
To use the terminology 11 12 13 14 15 This is not to commit myself to accepting the view that it is always better to follow one’s most reflective judgment. For criticism of this view, see Nomi Arpaly’s Unprincipled Virtue, chapter 2. This explication will have to be slightly modified later when I make the case that desires are essentially perspectival. Nagel distinguishes between motivated and unmotivated desire, and Schueler distinguishes between a desire proper and a pro-attitude. In their terminology, my notion of desire is supposed to cover both motivated and unmotivated desires, and I am using the ‘‘pro-attitude’’ sense of desire.
20 If the scholastic view allows for criticism of the content of the agent’s desires, it is not yet clear how it does so. Worse yet, it may appear that if the scholastic view presents the good just as a formal aim of practical reason, then it is vacuous. Just to postulate an aim of practical reason and then be silent about it might seem to make scholastic views into trivial variants of nonscholastic ones. As Peter 18 19 20 For a representative statement of this view, see David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, chapter 2.
The possibility of desiring the bad is thus no more mysterious than the fact that we can know that the raccoon is alive and at the same time think that when we look at and touch him he appears to be dead. Just as in theoretical reason reflection upon available evidence might prevent us from judging wrongly but not from having appearances present themselves to us in a deceptive manner, in practical reason reflection upon the various appearances of the good might allow us to know that something is bad without preventing it from appearing to us, from certain perspectives, to be good.